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THE VALUE OF CHANCE AND THE SATISFACTION
OF CLAIMS*

This paper suggests a new explanation for the fairness of lot-
teries as distributional devices. The explanation draws on ele-
ments of two existing accounts—those of John Broome and
Richard Bradley—but manages to overcome some difficulties associ-
ated with each of them.

According to Bradley's account,[1] using a lottery to distribute an
indivisible good among the members of some group is sometimes
justified because each member of the group values every additional
unit of chance of having the good less the higher her overall chance of
having the good is.

To demonstrate how this can explain the moral value of lotteries,
consider two individuals who roughly equally value some indivisible
good G, and as their overall chance of having G increases, the less they
value each extra unit of chance to get G. Each of these individuals
value a chance of 0.5 for G at more than half of how much they value a
chance of 1 for G (that is, having G with certainty). Thus, a lottery that
gives each of the individuals a chance of 0.5 for G generates a higher
total sum of personal value than the act of giving G to one of the
individuals without using a lottery.

[1] Richard Bradley, "Ellsberg's Paradox and the Value of Chances," unpublished manu-
script, available here: http://personal.lse.ac.uk/bradleyr/pdf/Ellsbergs%20paradox10.pdf.
This is a longer version of Richard Bradley, "Ellsberg Paradox and the Value of Chances,"
Economics and Philosophy, XXXII, 2 (July 2016): 231–48.

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COMMENTS AND CRITICISM

NATURAL NAME THEORY AND LINGUISTIC KINDS*

Pure quotation cases are those in which we quote "not to report what another says, but simply to talk about linguistic expressions."[1] For example:

(1) 'Table' has five letters.
(2) In the above, 'bank' is ambiguous.

The first word of (1) is being used to talk about the word 'table', and in (2), 'bank' is being used to refer to some previous utterance or expression of the word 'bank'. This is in contrast to other forms of quotation, such as in:

(3) "But I have one hand tied behind my back due to government policies and inaction," he told the Guardian.[2]
(4) The government's latest plan, produced in July, was condemned as "woefully inadequate" by city leaders and "inexcusable" by doctors.[3]

In both (3) and (4), the quoted material is reporting what another has said.

Michael Johnson has proposed the natural name theory in order to explain cases of pure quotation.[4] This view holds that in cases of pure quotation, the quoted term(s) "is a natural name of a linguistic object."[5] Thus, in (1), the first word is the natural name for the word

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[1] Herman Cappelen and Ernie Lepore, "Varieties of Quotation," *Mind*, CVI, 423 (July 1997): 429–50.

[2] Damien Carrington, "London reaches legal air pollution limit just one month into the new year," *The Guardian*, January 30, 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2018/jan/30/london-reaches-legal-air-pollution-limit-just-one-month-into-the-new-year.

[3] *Ibid.*

[4] Michael Johnson, "Pure Quotation and Natural Naming," this JOURNAL, CXV, 10 (October 2018): 550–66. This claim is limited to pure quotation. For a defense of giving different theoretical explanations of different types of quotation, see *ibid.*, pp. 561–62. This outline of Johnson's discussion is far from exhaustive, and merely seeks to highlight the relevant features of the theory for my aims here.

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 553. I will talk about linguistic *objects* even though I note that it is not clear that some of the entities named are objects in any standard sense of the term. Rather, spellings, pronunciations, and even meanings may be *properties* rather than objects (see J. T. M. Miller, "Words, Substance, and Bundle Theory," unpublished manuscript). If some referents of pure quotations are linguistic properties and not objects, then some changes in the view defended here might be needed.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Value of Rationality. RALPH WEDGWOOD. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. x + 278 p. Cloth $40.95.

The first installment of a trilogy, Ralph Wedgwood's *The Value of Rationality* lays the groundwork for a distinctive, unified theory of rationality across the practical and theoretical domains. Wedgwood is interested in rationality in the sense of the "*proper use* of the faculty of reason" (25, 32). He seeks to give an interpretation of what this proper use amounts to that appropriately respects key insights and challenges from a variety of debates that rarely cross-fertilize: debates about the normativity of rationality; epistemological debates about the nature of rational or justified belief, including debates in formal epistemology; and debates about the nature of practical reason and reasons, and of rational choice and intention, including formal decision theory (15–16). While many chapters can be read independently of each other, the vision of rationality that emerges is impressively systematic, even if crucial details have to wait until the second and third installments. Even where I disagreed, it was instructive to think through Wedgwood's arguments. This is an ambitious, admirable book that deserves deep and careful engagement.

The book is framed by a version of a familiar puzzle about whether and why rationality is "normative": whether and why it matters, in some intuitively important sense, whether one's mental states, events, and processes are rational (4–7). While Wedgwood sometimes remarks that it is simply "clear why it is interesting to find out what it is to use [one's faculty of reason] properly" (32), and seems to regard the notion of a "proper" use of one's reason as a fairly obviously normative one (1–2, 25–26, 32), he acknowledges that we need to explicate what the relevant sense of "normative" amounts to (2, 13–15, 28, 40). Further, Wedgwood explains, once we appreciate an important truth about rationality—namely, that evaluations of mental states or events as rational or irrational are purely "internal" evaluations—it becomes harder to see what is valuable or normative about rationality (4–5). The sense of "internal" here corresponds roughly to a brand of mentalist internalism in epistemology, whereby the status of a mental state or event as rational (to a certain degree) at time t is determined purely by its relations to other mental states and events of the agent, at "or shortly before" t (2–4 and chapter 7, especially 194–95). Rationality is, in a broad sense, a matter of

BOOK REVIEWS

Making Things Up. KAREN BENNETT. New York: Oxford University Press, 2017. xii + 260 p. Cloth $61.00.

Karen Bennett's *Making Things Up* is an important and metaphysically rich book focused on key issues in contemporary metaphysics including, but not limited to, the nature of fundamentality (both relative and absolute), causation, grounding, and, most centrally, the notion of *building*. *Making Things Up* is also fun to read: it is imaginative, provocative, and written in Bennett's characteristically clear and charming style.

The first three chapters are focused on clarifying the idea of a building relation, about which I will say more momentarily. In chapter four, Bennett argues for a position that I suspect contemporary metaphysicians will find especially contentious, specifically, that causation is a diachronic building relation. (I suspect, however, that a view like this would find sympathy from some early modern philosophers.) In chapters five and six, Bennett defends a reduction of absolute and relative fundamentality to building. In chapter seven, Bennett turns to the question of what builds building. Finally, in chapter eight, Bennett defends the view that there are some non-fundamental objects, contrary to a thesis that she calls "flatworldism."

Let me turn now to building. The intuitive idea is that a building relation is a relation by which some things make up some other thing, hence the title of the book. Bennett defends a kind of *building pluralism* according to which there are many building relations, each of which is of more metaphysical interest than a general building relation of which it might be a specification (25–29). More formally, according to Bennett, relation R is a *building relation* if and only if (i) it is antisymmetric and irreflexive, (ii) it induces necessitation, that is, if x bears R to y, then necessarily, if x exists, then y exists, and (iii) it is "generative," that is, "Built entities exist or obtain because that which builds them does" (32, 60).

Bennett also endorses a principle about building called "B→MFT," which is stated as follows: for all x and y, and all building relations B, if x at least partially Bs y, then x is more fundamental than y (40, 63). But she rejects the suggestion that B→MFT be taken as a fourth condition on what it is to be a building relation. Part of her motivation for rejecting this suggestion is that she wants to explain relative fundamentality in terms of patterns of building; this is the reductive project